Current projects
Intuitive Topology
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Intuitive network topology
There are many ways to describe and represent the visuospatial world. A space can be described by its Euclidean properties: the size of objects, the angles of boundaries, the distances between them. A space can also be described in non-spatial terms: one could explain the layout of a city by the order of its streets, without any metric information. Somewhere in between, topological representations capture coarse relational structure without precise Euclidean detail, offering a relatively efficient, low-dimensional way of capturing spatial content. In this project, we examine ‘intuitive network topology’. We show that people readily differentiate objects based on several different features of topological networks, and that people both remember and match objects in accordance with their topological features, as well.
This work is published in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
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Perceiving topological relations
Here, we ask whether people quickly and automatically perceive topological structure. In six experiments, we show that differences in simple topological features influence a range of visual tasks from object matching to number estimation to visual search. We discuss the possibility that topological forms are a kind of visual primitive that supports visuospatial representation.
This work is currently in press at Psychological Science.
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Children's reasoning about topological relations
In ongoing work, we are exploring how children reason about topological relations, and how this relates to core knowledge of other spatial domains, like geometry.
This work is currently under review.
Visual adaptation
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Number adaptation: A critical look
It is often assumed that adaptation — a temporary change in sensitivity to a perceptual dimension following exposure to that dimension — is a litmus test for what is and is not a “primary visual attribute”. Thus, papers purporting to find evidence of number adaptation motivate a claim of great philosophical significance: That number is something that can be seen in much the way that canonical visual features, like color, contrast, size, and speed, can. Fifteen years after its reported discovery, number adaptation’s existence seems to be nearly undisputed, with dozens of papers documenting support for the phenomenon. In this paper is to offer a counterweight: We critically assess the evidence for and against number adaptation.
This work is published in Cognition.
See also: our demos page and our number adaptation bibliography.
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Size adaptation: Do you know it when you see it?
In this paper, we critically examine visual adaptation to size. Supported by evidence from four experiments, we argue that, despite robust effects of size adaptation in the lab, (1) size adaptation effects are phenomenologically underwhelming (in some cases, hardly appreciable at all), (2) some effects of size adaptation appear contradictory, and difficult to explain given current theories of size adaptation, and (3) prior studies on size adaptation may have failed to isolate size as the relevant dimension. We argue that while there is evidence to license the claim that size adaptation is genuine, size adaptation is a puzzling and poorly understood phenomenon.
You can also refer to our demos page. This work is currently published in Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics.
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Visual adaptation and the contents of perception
In an upcoming theoretical paper, we explore in greater detail what it means to say that we adapt to a certain feature, as well as the practical and theoretical implications of such claims. This is a huge undertaking, for which we are hoping to have a manuscript prepared soon!
This work is currently in preparation.
Visuospatial representation
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Redundancy and reducibility in the formats of spatial representations
Mental representations are the essence of cognition. Yet to understand how the mind works, one must understand not just the content of mental representations (i.e., what information is stored) but also the format of those representations (i.e., how that information is stored). But what does it mean for representations to be formatted? How many formats are there? Is it possible that the mind represents some pieces of information in multiple formats at once? Here, I argue that seemingly “redundant” formats may support the flexible spatial behavior observed in humans and that researchers should approach the study of all mental representations with this possibility in mind.
This work is published in Perspectives on Psychological Science.
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The shape of space: Evidence for spontaneous but flexible use of polar coordinates in visuospatial representations
What is the format of spatial representation? In mathematics, we often conceive of two primary ways of representing 2D space, Cartesian coordinates, which capture horizontal and vertical relations, and polar coordinates, which capture angle and distance relations. Do either of these two coordinate systems play a representational role in the human mind? Six experiments, using a simple visual-matching paradigm, show that (a) representational format is recoverable from the errors that observers make in simple spatial tasks, (b) human-made errors spontaneously favor a polar coordinate system of representation, and (c) observers are capable of using other coordinate systems when acting in highly structured spaces (e.g., grids).
This work is published in Psychological Science.
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A common format for representing spatial location in visual and motor working memory
Does the mind rely on similar systems of spatial representation for both perception and action? Here, we assessed the format of location representations in two simple spatial localization tasks. In one task, participants simply remembered the location of an item based solely on visual input. In another, participants remembered the location of a point in space based solely on kinesthetic input. We argue that polar coordinates may be a common means of representing location information across visual and motor modalities, but that these representations are also flexible in form.
This work is published in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.
Remembering when
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More than a moment: What does it mean to call something an 'event'?
Experiences are stored in the mind as discrete mental units, or ‘events,’ which influence—and are influenced by—attention, learning, and memory. In this way, the notion of an ‘event’ is foundational to cognitive science. However, despite tremendous progress in understanding the behavioral and neural signatures of events, there is no agreed-upon definition of an event. Here, we discuss different theoretical frameworks of event perception and memory, noting what they can and cannot account for in the literature. We highlight key aspects of events that we believe should be accounted for in theories of event processing — in particular, we argue that the structure and substance of events should be better reflected in our theories and paradigms.
This work is published in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.
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Event representation at the scale of ordinary experience
Weeks are divided into weekdays and weekends; years into semesters and seasons; lives into stages like childhood, adulthood, and adolescence. How does the structure of experience shape memory? Here, we show that memories for events recalled from popular TV shows exhibit several hallmarks of event cognition. Namely, we find that memories are organized with respect to their event structure (boundaries), and that beginnings and endings are better remembered at multiple levels of the event hierarchy simultaneously.
This work is published in Cognition.
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An illusion of time?
Our lives are busy: We are constantly bombarded by endless streams of information, worrisome headlines, and never-ending lists of to-dos. In all that chaos, how do we remember when things occurred? In this work, we explore one possible answer to this question. In that process, we document a robust illusion of time that we experience every day of our lives.
This work is currently in press at Psychological Science.